Chinese Nuclear Weapons (2000s-present)

In the last few decades, China has begun to shift its nuclear posture and developments from a small, static force towards a larger force with more capabilities (and consequently opening the door to move away from a no-first use policy). This article discusses the recent history of China's nuclear competition and investments, and attempts to list some potential explanations as to why these changes are being made.

What has China been developing/building?

Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Main article: Unnamed Chinese Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)

Recently, China has been developing a number of previously unknown/unidentified HGVs. Over Summer 2021, China conducted multiple tests of these systems, much to the surprise of many who assumed they had no HGV ambitions.

Nuclear Silo Field(s)

Main article: Chinese Silo Fields

Thanks to the great work of some fellow wonks, major construction was found at two different sites in western China, indicating a massive construction project that amounts to a massive silo field. Similar in design to the MPS system in the MX Basing Study, altogether we end up with a picture indicating significant nuclear expansion by China.

Fissile Material production?

Some have argued that the rapid ramp-up of nuclear energy generation in China serves the dual purpose of allowing fissile material production and eventual reprocessing for future weapons; however, this is currently little more than speculation.

Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities?

Essentially, the above systems amount to 1. more survivability and 2. more penetrability in offensive systems. One possible explanation for this is the Stability-Instability Paradox, which argues rivals whose nuclear capabilities/deterrence is matched may actually feel more comfortable with conventional conflict, knowing that a full-out war is impossible. With this line of thinking, it makes sense that China would pursue survivability: being vulnerable to US SSBNs, a first-strike plan doesn't make sense, but deterrence does.

On the other hand, some have argued that much of the problem stems from similar origins as the ongoing arms race with Russia: US policymakers are fundamentally incapable of accepting mutual vulnerability (and from it stable deterrence), such that rising tensions incentivize an arms race. Indeed, there is some backing to this claim: as far back as 2000 (!) people have been arguing that China sees its minimum deterrence as fundamentally eroded in the face of modernization programs by Russia and the US.

Take, for example, the W76-2 low-yield variant. With enough precision and the exact right amount of power, some studies have indicated the existing Chinese nuclear deterrent could be destroyed with less than 700 fatalities, rather than the millions often assumed in a nuclear conflict. In a wider conflict, this may be considered acceptable to eliminate a nuclear threat.

Another factor in all this is the role of missile defense. TODO: better develop this section

How should the US respond?

Quite simply, the easiest solution may have been to work directly with China in the early 2000s to develop a stable deterrence relationship, but this would have likely required limiting missile defenses and modernization programs that the US alone was able to afford (and which created numerous jobs across the country). Additionally, the Bush administration policy was to shoot for primacy in all weapons systems across the globe, with not much room for Arms Control.

Another option may be to declare a no-first use policy, similar to that of China itself. However, this again would contradict things like our current GBSD Modernization program: words mean little when you're spending billions on new weapons. Even worse, ideas like micro-nukes are a knife in the back of any move towards a more stable relationship.