Chinese Nuclear Weapons (2000s-present) - Revision history

Bmueller: /* Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities? */

2022-01-06T16:19:08Z

Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities?

Bmueller: /* Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities? */

2022-01-06T16:15:12Z

Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities?

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2022-01-06T11:04:55Z

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Bmueller: Created page with "todo Category:China Category:Nuclear Category:Explanation Article"

2021-12-31T19:01:09Z

Created page with "todo Category:China Category:Nuclear Category:Explanation Article"

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 On the other hand, some have argued that much of the problem stems from similar origins as the ongoing arms race with Russia: US policymakers are fundamentally incapable of accepting mutual vulnerability (and from it stable deterrence), such that rising tensions incentivize an arms race. Indeed, there is some backing to this claim: as far back as 2000 (!) people have been arguing that China sees its minimum deterrence as fundamentally eroded in the face of modernization programs by Russia and the US.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/20049808?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref>
-Take, for example, the W76-2 low-yield variant. With enough precision and the exact right amount of power, some studies have indicated the existing Chinese nuclear deterrent could be destroyed with ''less than'' ''700 fatalities'', rather than the millions often assumed in a nuclear conflict. In a wider conflict, this may be considered acceptable to eliminate a nuclear threat.<ref>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-11-01/nukes-we-need</ref>
+Take, for example, the W76-2 low-yield variant. With enough precision and the exact right amount of power, some studies have indicated the existing Chinese nuclear deterrent could be destroyed with ''less than'' ''700 fatalities'', rather than the millions often assumed in a nuclear conflict. In a wider conflict, this may be considered acceptable to eliminate a nuclear threat.<ref>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-11-01/nukes-we-need</ref> Essentially, the US has all the pieces there for a counterforce mission (small-ish nukes, highly precise missiles, targeting, etc.) that could wipe out Chinese nuclear deterrent.
 Another factor in all this is the role of missile defense. TODO: better develop this section

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	== Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities? ==		== Why is China pursuing expanded nuclear capabilities? ==
		+	Essentially, the above systems amount to 1. more survivability and 2. more penetrability in offensive systems. One possible explanation for this is the [[Stability-Instability Paradox]], which argues rivals whose nuclear capabilities/deterrence is matched may actually feel ''more'' comfortable with conventional conflict, knowing that a full-out war is impossible. With this line of thinking, it makes sense that China would pursue survivability: being vulnerable to US [[SSBN]]<nowiki/>s, a first-strike plan doesn't make sense, but deterrence does.<ref>https://twitter.com/NarangVipin/status/1451018534490976261?s=20</ref><ref>https://twitter.com/ProfTalmadge/status/1451139132651102208?s=20</ref>
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		+	On the other hand, some have argued that much of the problem stems from similar origins as the ongoing arms race with Russia: US policymakers are fundamentally incapable of accepting mutual vulnerability (and from it stable deterrence), such that rising tensions incentivize an arms race. Indeed, there is some backing to this claim: as far back as 2000 (!) people have been arguing that China sees its minimum deterrence as fundamentally eroded in the face of modernization programs by Russia and the US.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/20049808?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref>
		+
		+	Take, for example, the W76-2 low-yield variant. With enough precision and the exact right amount of power, some studies have indicated the existing Chinese nuclear deterrent could be destroyed with ''less than'' ''700 fatalities'', rather than the millions often assumed in a nuclear conflict. In a wider conflict, this may be considered acceptable to eliminate a nuclear threat.<ref>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-11-01/nukes-we-need</ref>
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		+	Another factor in all this is the role of missile defense. TODO: better develop this section
		+
		+	== How should the US respond? ==
		+	Quite simply, the easiest solution may have been to work directly with China in the early 2000s to develop a stable deterrence relationship, but this would have likely required limiting missile defenses and modernization programs that the US alone was able to afford (and which created numerous jobs across the country). Additionally, the Bush administration ''policy'' was to shoot for primacy in all weapons systems across the globe, with not much room for Arms Control.<ref>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-03-01/rise-us-nuclear-primacy</ref>
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		+	Another option may be to declare a no-first use policy, similar to that of China itself. However, this again would contradict things like our current [[GBSD Modernization]] program: words mean little when you're spending billions on new weapons. Even worse, ideas like micro-nukes are a knife in the back of any move towards a more stable relationship.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699857?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref>

	== References ==		== References ==

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